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Arendt famously criticised ‘the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist 
on regarding as “inalienable” those human rights… which are enjoyed only by 
citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries’ (Arendt 1968: 279).  This 
paper explores, from a sociological perspective, the relationship between citizens and 
humans in the light of the ongoing legalisation of human rights.  Cosmopolitan law-
in-the-making is contributing to the creation of different statuses along the 
oppositional fault-line between citizens and those who are ‘barely human’ and, 
paradoxically, to a situation in which human rights actually become dangerous for 
those who are ambiguously positioned in this way.  This paradox is nowhere more 
evident than in the case of the ‘Belmarsh detainees’, detained without charge (in clear 
violation of their fundamental human rights) because they could not be returned to the 
states of which they were nationals (to respect for their human rights).  The paper 
explores the legal and political meanings of this case in order to consider the 
relationship between citizenship and human rights today and to assess the value of 
Arendt’s scepticism today.    
 
Barely human or global citizen? 
Writing of the treatment of stateless persons, refugees and minorities without powerful 
governments to protect them between the two World Wars, which culminated in the 
genocide of Armenians and Jews, Hannah Arendt famously criticised ‘the efforts of 
well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as “inalienable” those human 
rights… which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized 
countries’ (Arendt 1968: 279).  Arendt saw human rights as untenable because they are 
based on the abstraction of humanity rather than on any possibility of participation, 
whether democratic or revolutionary, in a concrete political community.  She noted 
that: 
 
‘The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human 
being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to 
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost 
all other qualities and specific relationships – except they were still human.  The 
world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human’ (Arendt 
1968: 299).   
 
When Arendt wrote these words in the late 1940s she was looking back to what she saw 
as the making of a new world of chaos and catastrophe as a result of the disintegration 
of empires with the First World War.  In terms of human rights, however, at the time 
she was writing the world was at another beginning, that of the global regime of human 
rights which started with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10th 
1948.  Arendt’s reading of historical evidence led her to scepticism regarding the future 
of human rights.  We are now in a position to reflect on how far the potential of this 
new global regime has been realised.  
 
In more recent times, Arendt’s understanding has inspired Georgio Agamben’s critique 
of human rights.  He argues that human rights are impossible because the ‘bare life’ 
(bios) of humanity, where it does not vanish into the figure of the national citizen, is the 
constitutive Other on which national political community is founded: the bare life of 
humanity is precisely what must be excluded from the political life (zoe) of citizens 
(Agamben 1995, 1996).  It is unclear whether this exclusion is, for Agamben, 
historically, or logically - even metaphysically - necessary.  Agamben maintains that 
the gap between citizens and non-citizens is opening still more widely under the 
pressure of what he (like Arendt in her time), sees as the symptomatic element of 
contemporary politics: the fact of growing numbers of refugees which puts pressure on 
the structure of national sovereignty.  However, Agamben does not reflect on the 
progressive potential of UN regime of human rights – not to mention that of Europe 
which is derived from it – focussing rather on what was already evident, according to 
his analysis, at the time of the French Revolution.   
 
Since the great national declarations of human rights in the C18th, the French and the 
American, and since Arendt wrote in the 1940s, there has been a major shift in human 
rights: the increasing legalisation of international human rights which cross, contest, 
and even reconfigure jurisdictional borders (1).  By ‘legalisation’ I mean the way in 
which international human rights agreements are becoming more detailed, precise and 
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binding; and the way in which law that draws on and invokes human rights is 
increasingly being used and applied in both national and international courts (see 
Abbot and Keohane 2001).  The legalisation of international human rights treaties and 
conventions is precisely aimed at effectively abolishing the distinction between 
citizens and ‘barely human’ non-citizens.   
 
Traditionally international law concerned only relations between sovereign states.  
After World War Two, liberal internationalism began more systematically to 
challenge the distinction between citizens and non-citizens on which state sovereignty 
was based.  These changes to international law are sometimes known as the 
‘Nuremberg principles’ because they were initially developed in the Nuremberg trials 
that followed World War Two.  Two major changes in international law came 
together in the legal aftermath of this war.  Firstly, individuals became criminally 
accountable for violations of the laws of war (‘just obeying orders’ was no longer a 
legitimate legal defence, however lowly a position the accused held in the military or 
state hierarchy).  Secondly, principles of human rights began to be developed, which 
prescribed limits to a government’s conduct towards its own citizens, to apply in 
times of peace and war (Ratner and Abrams 2001: 4; see also Held 1995: 101-2).  
This second principle was carried forward and extended with the UDHR, beginning 
international human rights law in the UN human rights system.  According to the 
UDHR, and subsequent international human rights law based on it, individuals have 
human rights, and also the responsibility to uphold human rights, regardless of 
citizenship status or residency.  As Article 2 of the UDHR has it: 
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the 
basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty’ (2). 
 
However, with the partial exception of the European system of human rights, the 
balance of powers until the end of the Cold War meant that international law 
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effectively maintained classic state sovereignty, being overwhelmingly concerned 
with keeping the peace between states (Held 2002).   
 
Since the Cold War, however, some argue that we are now seeing the beginning of 
cosmopolitan law.  In contrast to international law, and building on the ‘Nuremberg 
principles’, cosmopolitan law reaches inside states, piercing nominal state sovereignty 
and enforcing claims against human rights violators (see Held 2002; Hirsh 2003).  
Undoubtedly the best example of cosmopolitan law is European human rights law: the 
European Court of Human Rights is effectively ‘the constitutional court for civil and 
political rights’ in Europe, hearing complaints from individuals, who may be citizens 
or non-citizens, as well as from member states (Buergenthal 2002: 172; Dembour 
2006).  Another good example of cosmopolitan law is customary international law, 
defined as established state practice, which states understand to be followed ‘from a 
sense of legal obligation’ (Steiner and Alston 2000: 70).  The sources used to establish 
customary international law include such a diverse array as ‘newspaper reports of 
actions taken by states… statements made by government spokesmen [sic] to 
Parliament, to the press, at international conferences… a state’s laws and judicial 
decisions’ and multilateral treaties (Steiner and Alston 2000: 73).  They also include 
judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified legal experts, and the 
resolutions and declarations of international governmental organisations like the 
General Assembly of the UN (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000).  Customary 
international law is increasingly drawn upon in national as well as international 
courts; celebrated examples include the extradition case against General Pinochet and 
cases that use the Alien Tort Claims Act in the US (see Nash forthcoming).   
 
The aim of human rights activists and legal innovators who support and extend 
cosmopolitan law is that each and every individual should become legally responsible 
for the rights of each and every other individual, regardless of nationality or 
residency, and regardless of internal domestic politics, even where there are clashes 
between international human rights norms and national law.  In this respect, 
cosmopolitan law is intended to create a new political community to replace nations 
organised around states, a global community that is set up to abolish the distinction 
between citizen and non-citizen on which national states are founded.  Global citizens 
happen to be resident in particular states, because there is no world-state, but, 
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according to this vision, we all have rights and responsibilities created by 
cosmopolitan law.     
 
In this chapter I will explore the discrepancy between Arendt’s and Agamben’s 
pessimism concerning human rights, and the determined optimism of ‘well-meaning 
idealists’.  I will explore the cosmopolitan project to abolish the distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens through human rights from a sociological perspective.  As 
sociologists we are well-equipped to study how the legalisation of human rights works 
in practice.  In the following section I consider how the legalisation of human rights is 
working in terms of what sociologists have traditionally seen as the three dimensions 
of citizenship within national states: civil, political and social rights.  I will then go on 
to consider in more detail a critical example concerning the civil rights of non-
citizens, looking at the relationship between national civil liberties and human rights 
in the case of terrorist suspects detained without charge or trial in the UK.  I conclude 
by considering the dangers and the potentialities of human rights today. 
 
Citizenship and human rights: a question of status  
I follow T. H. Marshall’s classic definition of citizenship as according civil rights of 
individual freedom, political rights of participation and social rights to basic levels of 
provision for education, housing, health-care and welfare (Marshall 1992: 8).  Although 
Marshall’s model of citizenship is undoubtedly flawed, it is still the common reference 
point for sociologists working in this area (Turner 2002).  In order to explore the 
relationship between citizenship and human rights, David Lockwood’s work on civic 
stratification is a useful starting point (see Morris 2006).  Lockwood argues that the 
actual enjoyment of rights depends on two interlinked axes of inequality: the presence 
or absence of legal, bureaucratic rights; and the possession of moral or material 
resources, which generally operate informally.   
 
From a sociological perspective, then, the enjoyment of rights is never simply a matter 
of legal entitlement; it also depends on social structures through which power, material 
resources, and meanings are created and circulated.  As we shall see, in relation to non-
citizens, citizenship, as membership of a national political community, is itself a 
material and a moral resource as well as permitting individual citizens legal 
entitlements.  The interplay of the two axes of legal entitlement and material and moral 
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resources means that legal claims to human rights that are intended to ‘humanise’ states 
are actually tending to produce new types of formally and substantively unequal status.  
An analysis of different types of status produced with respect to citizenship and human 
rights would have to include at least the following five distinctions.   
 
Firstly, within the legal status of ‘full citizenship’ there is a marked difference between 
what we might call ‘super-citizens’ and ‘marginal citizens’ in relation to human rights.  
Super-citizens have all the rights of citizens but increasingly, in a globalizing, de-
regulated political economy, citizenship does not tie them to states, because they own 
the means of production or are in possession of secure employment or marketable skills 
which enable mobility across borders.  Super-citizens are Craig Calhoun’s ‘frequent 
flier’ elite cosmopolitans (Calhoun 2003).  This group has very little material interest as 
a group in human rights except insofar as human rights policies succeed in making the 
world generally more stable and profitable.  Their protected mobility comes from their 
citizenship status as well as from their wealth and/or skills.  When faced with unstable 
or dangerous political conditions, super-citizens are more likely to fly home or appeal 
to the authorities of the states to which they belong to intervene on their behalf than 
they are to claim human rights.  As individuals, members of this group may be involved 
in the extension of human rights as professionals – especially as lawyers, leaders of 
INGOs, or researchers – but they would not generally expect to see themselves as the 
subjects of human rights claims.   
 
Super-citizens can be compared with a second status group, ‘marginal citizens’, who 
have full citizenship rights but who either do not have paid work, or who have insecure, 
low paid or partial participation in the labour market.  This group enjoys full citizenship 
rights to a variable degree, according to different dimensions of inequality and 
subordination.  As a category these people have civil rights to protect them from state 
force in a reasonably functioning multi-party democracy.  However, young black and 
Muslim men and women, for example, are more likely to be discriminated against if 
they need to positively exercise those rights than are others.  Moreover, it is 
increasingly the case that the social and economic benefits of citizenship to which 
marginal citizens have been entitled are under attack as the regulation of capitalism is 
altered through globalization (see Turner 2001).  The growth of the global human rights 
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regime is, of course, an aspect of gobalization, but in terms of deteriorating social 
citizenship, human rights are of little interest to marginal citizens.    
 
The history of social and economic rights has been very different from that of civil 
rights in terms of legalisation.  In principle, social and economic rights have been part 
of the core schedule of international human rights since the UDHR.  Article 22 of the 
UDHR, for example, which is just one of many that specify core welfare rights, states 
that everyone is entitled to realization ‘through national effort and international co-
operation’ of his economic, social and cultural rights.  What this should mean in 
practice was spelled out in still more detail in the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which entered into force in 1976, 
signed and ratified by most states (with the notable exception of the US).  
Nevertheless, a clear distinction was drawn between social and economic rights and 
civil and political rights from the very beginning of the global human rights regime, 
with socialists and liberals opposed over which set of rights should be ideologically 
and strategically prioritised (Forsythe 2000).  Since the end of the Cold War, 
economic and social rights are often compared to civil rights in respect of the logical 
possibilities of legalisation: it is hard to specify clear, detailed state obligations to 
meet social needs (especially where resources are lacking) in comparison with the the 
specific obligations on the part of specific agents to stop acting in certain ways that 
characterise civil rights (Donnelly 1989: 33-4; see also Dembour 2006).  This 
argument has become somewhat less compelling since social and economic rights 
were made justiciable in the South African constitution, where the state has been 
called to account in its national courts for violations of the social and economic rights 
of people under its jurisdiction (Olivier and Jansen van Ransburg 2006).  In the North, 
however, the term ‘human rights’ is still used almost exclusively in the mainstream 
mediated public to mean the civil rights covered by the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  (3) Claims to economic and social human rights 
have been effective for some migrants within existing, deteriorating state regimes of 
welfare – as we shall see in the case of quasi-citizens below - but human rights 
language has not been developed to address issues of welfare more generally.  There 
is, for example, no provision in the system of European human rights law for 
economic and social rights.  The European Social Charter of the Council of Europe is 
policy-oriented, relying on the supervision of practices through scrutiny of reports and 
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complaints submitted to the European Committee of Social Rights, which may 
recommend that states should bring national law and practice into conformity with the 
Charter. It does not allow for adjudication in the European Court of Human Rights.  
Despite the apparent importance of economic and social human rights in terms of 
international agreements, then, they have not become cosmopolitan law in the same 
way as civil rights, and they do not provide protection for marginal citizens in the 
North.  They appear rather, to be irrelevant to the welfare of these citizens.  
 
Thirdly, outside these unequally positioned citizens, there are ‘quasi-citizens’.  Quasi-
citizens are denizens, or long-term residents in a state who have access to employment 
and who have gained social and even economic rights as a result of relatively secure 
employment, long-term residence, and political mobilisation.  They have organised 
politically to put pressure on states to recognise their human rights in order to gain 
access to education, health-care, housing and other welfare rights on the same basis as 
citizens (Soysal 1994).  Quasi-citizens do not, however, have political rights to vote in 
the national elections of states in which they are resident, though they may, in some 
cases, have rights to vote in local elections (Balibar 2004; Benhabib 2007).   
 
The category of quasi-citizens contains a diverse group of people.  It includes some EU 
citizens - those from less powerful states who are employed in unskilled work - guest-
workers, and also those who have been granted refugee status.  Whilst, as Soysal has 
argued, what she calls ‘postnational citizenship’ has been an important advance for 
migrants in terms of institutionalising their human rights, the relative instability of their 
legal status (as they are ‘not-citizens’) and the dangers it creates for securing other 
fundamental human rights on which they may need to depend is becoming clearer.  An 
excellent example of the dangers of quasi-citizenship for human rights in this respect 
comes from the UK state’s treatment of those who have been granted asylum because 
of well-founded fears of persecution in the states of which they are nationals, and who 
have subsequently been arrested and detained without charge on suspicion of terrorist 
activities.  We will examine these cases more closely in the following section.   
 
If quasi-citizens are in a precarious position with regard to their fundamental human 
rights, sub-citizens routinely face even greater difficulties.  Sub-citizens are those who 
do not have paid employment in the country in which they are resident, nor any 
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entitlement to state benefits there.  This category includes those who are waiting to 
have asylum cases heard and who may be detained indefinitely in camps whilst that 
process is going on.  It also includes those considered to be adult dependents of quasi-
citizens – wives and other family members - who have no independent right to 
residence and who are, therefore, potentially subject to violence and abuse within the 
home (without real possibility of redress), as well from their home states.  The category 
of ‘sub-citizens’ is literally created by international human rights law as it is 
administered through state-specific policies.  The status of refugees in the country in 
which they are detained or resident is based on international law concerning the human 
rights of refugees, derived from the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, and on national regulations concerning the administration of that law.  Sub-
citizens who are the dependents of quasi-citizens have virtually no legal status in 
international law as individuals, but only that which has been won through national 
political mobilisation, usually by women’s groups.  In the UK, for example, it was as a 
result of such campaigning that the government finally lifted the rule which meant that 
a wife could not leave a husband who abused her during their first year of residence 
without being immediately removed from the country – though the type of evidence of 
abuse that is admitted in these cases is still unacceptably restricted (‘Campaigns’ 
www.southallblacksisters.org.uk, consulted 27/11/07).    
 
Finally, even sub-citizens are in a better position than un-citizens.  This group includes 
undocumented migrants who have no recognised status in receiving countries and who 
may, therefore, be immediately deported, unless they are permitted to apply for asylum.  
It also now includes people detained in the ‘war on terror’ in newly created ‘non-
places’ which are outside national territories and therefore somehow also outside the 
jurisdiction of sovereign states, whilst being under their administration.  The most 
famous example here is Guantanamo Bay, though there are also other such camps 
containing suspected terrorists in Bagram, Kandahar and elsewhere.  These un-citizens 
are in a legal ‘black hole’ because of the special status they have been assigned as 
‘illegal combatants’ and the extraordinary lengths to which the US executive has gone 
to deny them access to lawyers and to keep them out of US courts (Steyn 2004).  
Interestingly, with regard to Arendt’s suspicions concerning human rights, it is 
citizenship status, combined with diplomatic relations between allies, and not claims for 
human rights, which has enabled relief for some of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay.  
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For example, all those holding British passports were sent back to Britain and released 
without charge in 2005, but it was not until 2007 that the UK government, under legal 
pressure from the detainees’ families and following changes in US policy with regard to 
Guantanamo, requested the return of non-citizens resident in the UK.  At the time of 
writing there are still British residents in Guantanamo who have not been released.   
 
For quasi-citizens, sub-citizens and uncitizens, then, what we see is not so much the 
unfolding achievement of global citizenship, but rather a paradox: gross violations of 
fundamental human rights may be perpetuated because of the legal enforcement of 
other human rights.  Human rights which are ideally inviolable, universal, indivisible 
and protective of all human beings, citizens and non-citizens alike, are actually creating 
groups of persons whose rights are extremely fragile and insecure.  The insecure  
position of these people with regard to their legal status and also their access to material 
and moral resources is, on occasion, resulting in violations of the dignity, freedom and 
bodily integrity of those who have nothing but their human rights.  The increasing 
legalisation of human rights has led, then, neither to guarantees of human rights 
commitments, nor an end to human rights violations.  It has, however, led to a great 
deal of legal and political creativity.   
 
Citizens vs humans 
In this section we will look more closely at one particular situation of quasi-citizens in 
the UK, in order to explore in detail exactly how and why the legalisation of human 
rights is failing to secure the abolition of the distinction between citizens and humans.  
We will look more closely at the cases of the Belmarsh detainees.  These cases are 
critical as an example of the paradoxes of legalisation because they concern human 
rights law which is very well-established internationally and which covers 
fundamental civil rights.  In addition, we are dealing here with European human rights 
law, which is the most thoroughly institutionalised human rights system in the world.  
If legalisation leads to paradoxes in securing human rights in the European system, it 
is unlikely to have a happy outcome elsewhere.     
 
What this example shows is the way in which, when cosmopolitan law is relatively 
successful in abolishing the distinction between citizens and non-citizens in 
controversial cases, human rights come under increased political pressure.  In the case 
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of the arbitrary detention of terrorist suspects with which we are concerned here, there 
has been a political struggle, played out between politicians, the judiciary, human 
rights activists and journalists, in both formal and informal political spaces.  This 
struggle has concerned how human rights figure, and should figure, in imagining the 
political community.  In concrete terms it has been fought out over the meaning of the 
terms ‘human rights’ and ‘civil liberties’ as they are used by the judiciary, human 
rights activists and politicians.   
 
Cosmopolitan human rights law was relatively effective in abolishing the distinction 
between citizens and humans in the Belmarsh detainees’ case.  In order to detain 
suspected terrorists without charge, the UK Executive declared ‘a public emergency 
facing the nation’ to derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Article 5 forbids arbitrary detention, requiring that proper procedures of law 
should be followed if a person is detained, including telling them the reasons for their 
detention, charging them and bringing them ‘speedily’ before a judge.  The details of 
who has been held under the subsequent Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
(ATCSA) are secret but it seems that, according to the categories outlined above, most 
are quasi-citizens, granted leave to remain in Britain as refugees from persecution in 
the states of which they are nationals – which is why they can not be returned to those 
countries; and un-citizens, failed asylum-seekers who have not left the country or 
been deported but who presumably also can not be returned because they face 
persecution in the countries of which they are nationals. 
 
In December 2004 the Law Lords heard the ‘Belmarsh detainees’ case’ on appeal 
against the decision of a lower court that their detention was lawful, despite the fact 
that none had been charged or had any prospect of being tried (A v Home Secretary  
2004).  Although they refused to judge the declaration of public emergency as such in 
A v Home Secretary – citing ‘traditional deference’ of the courts to an Executive 
decision to declare a public emergency - the Law Lords (the UK Supreme Court) 
nevertheless ruled that the detentions were unlawful.  They found that ATCSA was 
disproportionate – arbitrary detention was a poor solution to the threat posed by the 
suspected terrorists; and discriminatory because it targeted only non-citizens.  In this 
sense, the logic of human rights was effective: all the judges agreed that it was not 
legal for the Executive to treat non-citizens differently from citizens even under the 
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exceptional circumstances of an officially declared, and legally sanctioned, state of 
emergency.  In response to the Lords’ ruling, parliament passed the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA) which granted the Executive the power to keep suspected 
terrorists under ‘control orders’ if the authorities had ‘reasonable suspicion’ about 
their activities based on secret evidence (which neither they nor their lawyers were 
allowed to see).  The PTA put an end to discrimination against non-citizens by 
sanctioning the violation of the fundamental rights of citizens too: all are potentially 
equally subject to a range of punitive measures without ever having been charged with 
a crime or having had the chance to defend themselves in court (5).   
 
The case was highly politicised. ‘Human rights’ was used to refer to and to make 
sense of the law regulating arbitrary detention in technical terms.  However, from the 
very beginning of debates over the suspension of fundamental rights, it was not the 
term ‘human rights’ but rather ‘civil liberties’, sometimes qualified as ‘British civil 
liberties’ or ‘centuries old liberties’, that mobilised political passions.  Opposition to 
the Executive decision to suspend rights was very frequently made, across the 
political spectrum, in terms of the glorious history of British freedoms.  Such 
sentiments were resoundingly invoked in arguments by both major political parties, 
by the leader of Liberty (e.g. Chakrabarti 2003) and most notably, and at some length, 
by Lord Hoffman in ‘the Belmarsh detainees’ case’.  In what one commentator (Poole 
2005) has described as ‘tabloid history’, Lord Hoffman constructed the European 
Convention as a modern-day protection of ancient British liberties, arguing that:  
‘Freedom from arbitrary arrest is a quintessentially British liberty, enjoyed by 
the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be 
thrown into prison at the whim of their rulers. It was incorporated into the 
European Convention in order to entrench the same liberty in countries which 
had recently been under Nazi occupation.  The United Kingdom subscribed to 
the Convention because it set out the rights which British subjects enjoyed 
under the common law’ (A v Home Secretary 2004: 50).    
   
We see here a strategy on the part of human rights supporters to join human rights and 
British traditions together in an appeal to national pride.  This strategy can be 
understood as an attempt to translate human rights into the vernacular of British 
political life.  Sally Engle Merry has shown how cultural politics are necessary to 
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bring human rights from the transnational sphere of global elites into local, everyday 
life.  In order for human rights to make sense to ordinary people in a society, they 
must be translated into terms that enable them to judge their situation in human rights 
terms, to see it as unjust and to take action against that injustice.  Merry calls this 
process of translation and framing, ‘making human rights vernacular’ (Merry 2006).   
 
The strategy to make human rights vernacular through an appeal to national pride was 
not successful.  On the contrary, rather than sharing in, or borrowing from, the passion 
aroused by commitment to fundamental ‘civil liberties’, the meaning of ‘human 
rights’ became all the more clearly separated and even opposed to ‘civil liberties’ in 
many sections of the media.  Outside liberal and legal circles, in fact, European 
human rights were increasingly understood as threatening the ancient civil liberties of 
British citizens.  On the one hand human rights were seen as responsible for letting 
terrorist suspects loose in the country because the government was not allowed to 
deport them; on the other, human rights were seen as responsible for overturning 
centuries of entrenched liberties for British citizens.   
 
Political opposition to human rights came from all quarters.  It came, for example, 
from the Prime Minister responsible for the Human Rights Act which incorporated the 
ECHR into British law in 1998.  In a speech following the terrorist attacks of 7/7, in 
which Tony Blair declared that ‘the rules of the game have changed’, he stated that 
human rights were creating obstacles to safeguarding national security (PM’s press 
conference August 5th 2005 www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp).  He 
proposed that foreigners suspected of terrorism should simply be deported.  It is in 
contravention of European human rights law to send a person to a state where they are 
at risk of torture (Chahal v UK 1996).  Blair’s suggestion in this speech that human 
rights law must be altered so that government measures to deal with terrorist threats 
are not to be judged to be in violation of human rights has been widely taken up.  
Reforming or ‘scrapping’ the Human Rights Act, which incorporates the ECHR into 
British law and which was passed by the Labour government in 1998, became part of 
the Conservative Party’s election manifesto in 2005.  The Sun, the newspaper with the 
widest circulation of any paper in the UK, went so far as to run a campaign soliciting 
readers’ votes to demand that the HRA should be repealed (see The Sun ‘Time to stop 
the madness’ 12/5/06). 
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 Although parliament can, in principle, repeal or alter the HRA, the UK must still 
comply with the ECHR, from which the HRA is derived.  To avoid European censure 
for not complying, the UK would have to leave the 47 states of the Council of Europe 
and also the European Union (because signing the ECHR is a condition of joining).  
The UK would effectively become a pariah state in Europe (Bognador 2006; see also 
Klug 2007).  This seems a very unlikely course of action for any government.   What 
the newly revived, and oft-repeated, opposition between ‘our’ security and ‘their’ 
rights does mean, however, is that although human rights are embedded in law in the 
UK, they are far from becoming part of the vernacular of political life.  Human rights 
are themselves now in need of defence, as well as those unpopular non-citizens 
accused of terrorist activities which human rights are supposed to protect.   
 
Conclusion  
Human rights are dangerous.  Human rights innovators and activists try to abolish the 
distinction between citizens and others, but in practice the legal extension of human 
rights is, paradoxically, producing categories of people who are vulnerable to human 
rights abuses precisely because of their insecure status in countries – or sometimes in 
specially designed ‘non-places’ - in which they live or are detained as non-citizens.  
This does not mean that the legalisation of human rights as such is problematic.  On the 
contrary, as it is the situation seems rather to require that the reach of cosmopolitan law 
should be extended and deepened.  The creation of a genuinely global citizenship of 
duties and entitlements would seem to be necessary in an unevenly globalizing world in 
which people are increasingly mobile, whether they are forced to move countries to 
escape poverty or persecution, or whether they are simply taking opportunities to 
change their lives that present themselves as a result of increased flows of 
communication and possibilities of transportation across borders.     
 
It is important, therefore, that we take heed of Arendt’s scepticism concerning human 
rights.  As we have seen, legalisation is only partially achieved, even when, on the face 
of it, the law itself seems to be quite clearly established.  Once human rights law is put 
into practice in controversial cases, it is contested precisely around safeguarding the 
opposition between citizens and humans.  Human rights were designed, in principle, to 
protect vulnerable people faced with the most difficult circumstances, whether of state 
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persecution or of poverty.  As we have seen in the example discussed here of the 
Belmarsh detainees, however, it is precisely when fundamental civil rights are most 
needed that they are most highly politicised.    
 
It is clear, then, that cosmopolitan law as a project can only advance as a result of 
political mobilisation.  It is necessary to find a way to build support for human rights 
within what have historically been constituted as national political communities.  The 
legalisation of human rights is not a technical matter; it is not a matter of simply 
applying the letter of the law as it already exists in international agreements, or even 
extending it through national legislation.  Cosmopolitan law will only progress as a 
result of politics, and it is closely tied to the formation of political community 
transformed by human rights.  Agamben is wrong: though states have historically been 
formed around the opposition between citizens and non-citizens, there appears to be 
nothing in the logic of state formation to prevent cosmopolitan law; if the distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens were fundamentally necessary to state formation, 
how is it that statuses that complicate and confound this opposition have proliferated in 
recent times as a result of cosmopolitan law?   
 
Of course, the difficulties of mobilising politically in order to extend cosmopolitan 
law towards achieving global citizenship are considerable.  In this chapter I have 
explored nationalism as one of the main obstacles to gaining popular consent for the 
abolition of the distinction between citizens and non-citizens.  In the case of the 
Belmarsh detainees, as a response to violations of human rights by state elites, human 
rights innovators in the judiciary and human rights activists tried to build pride in 
human rights into nationalism itself; they tried to turn sentiments concerning the 
exclusivity of national citizenship into sentiments of pride in the inclusivity of the 
political community, into pride in the nation because it upholds universal norms of 
human rights.  While it seems likely that at least some super-citizens will be attracted 
to the cosmopolitan idealism of this project, it is difficult to imagine that it would gain 
popular support from marginal citizens who may fear losing not only the material 
benefits of citizenship, including the security that is supposed to be assured by a well-
functioning state, but also its relative moral status in comparison with quasi- sub- and 
un-citizens.  The moral status of citizenship was at least as much in question in this 
case as were legal entitlements to human rights; the government was unwilling, 
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initially, to extend measures to detain citizens without charge that it did not hesitate to 
apply to non-citizens.  I have suggested that as human rights are currently conceived 
in the North, in terms of the civil rights that most citizens feel they already enjoy quite 
securely, citizens apparently have little to gain from the extension of human rights.  
Indeed, as we have seen, in ruling discrimination between citizens and non-citizens 
illegal in the Belmarsh case, a judgement which was correct in terms of cosmopolitan 
law paved the way for the government to remove fundamental civil rights from 
citizens.   
 
In order to construct popular support for human rights, which is the only way to achieve 
their secure legalisation in the most difficult political circumstances, it is necessary to 
show how human rights are relevant and necessary to citizens.  The energies of the 
cosmopolitan project have been put, quite reasonably, into extending the law and 
building support for the human rights of vulnerable non-citizens in order to ‘protect the 
human’.  In order to break down the dichotomy between citizen and non-citizen, it may, 
however, be necessary also to foreground how human rights can be used to protect the 
freedom and well-being of citizens as well as non-citizens.  This most certainly will not 
be easy.  It is very doubtful that it can be achieved through an appeal to nationalism 
which, by definition, divides the world into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  As there is, 
however, no going back to a world of closed borders, in a globalizing world, the ‘well-
meaning idealism’ of human rights innovators and activists has become absolutely 
necessary.   
 
Notes 
1. I focus on legalisation here for reasons of space, but elsewhere I have analysed how 
human rights are becoming ‘intermestic’ along a number of other dimensions too.  The 
legalisation of human rights complicates the international/domestic division assumed 
by conventional legal scholarship; in addition, political use of the language of human 
rights is increasingly important in the rhetoric both of state elites and of NGOs (which 
themselves cross borders, often having ambiguous status in relation to the 
international/domestic distinction) to justify action at home and abroad; and – as we 
will see later in this chapter – human rights are contested in the cultural politics of the 
mediated public sphere in popular terms as well (see Nash 2007; forthcoming).   
 
 16
2. The UN system replaced the failed Minorities Treaties of the League of Nations, 
which Arendt writes of in terms of human rights.  In contrast to the protection of 
minorities afforded by the League of Nations, the UN system was designed as 
formally universalist, set up to protect the rights of all individuals (not some groups) 
in all states (not just those selected for the patronage of the Great Powers) (Mazower 
2004).   
 
3. For example, the Make Poverty History campaign that was so popular in 2005, and 
that continues today, never used the term ‘human rights’ (see Nash forthcoming).   
 
4. The UK remained bound by the ECHR, even as it opted out of certain key Articles 
of the Convention.  When the UK incorporated the ECHR into domestic law as the 
Human Rights Act in 1998, the Law Lords (the UK Supreme Court) became legally 
bound to judge whether the Executive decision to declare a state of exception was 
justified.  Derogation from the ECHR must be lawful according to the ECHR itself: 
the measures that are put in place to deal with the dangers presented must be 
proportionate to the situation; and they must be compatible with other human rights 
obligations under international law (Article 15 ECHR).  The Law Lords are also 
legally bound to judge whether the exceptional measures the UK government put in 
place in ATCSA were proportionate and consistent with the UK’s other human rights 
obligations.   
 
5. The government has appealed various High Court rulings that control orders are not 
compatible with human rights, depriving individuals of liberty and of rights to due 
process that require derogation from the ECHR (Joint Committee on Human Rights 
Eighth Report 2007).  On October 31st 2007, the Law Lords basically endorsed the 
control order regime, though they set limits to the curfews that could be imposed and 
ruled that suspects should have access to ‘key evidence’ against them (case reference).  
There will undoubtedly be further legal challenges to that ruling. 
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